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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff/Respondent Kevin Seward chose a summary judgment procedure for enforcement 
of an alleged oral settlement agreement. He is therefore required to prove there are no material 
disputed facts as to whether the parties each intended to be bound by the oral agreement prior to 
the execution of a written document. He failed to do so. Instead, the affidavits he submitted in 
support of his motion and of record before this Court show that the parties continued to negotiate 
a final agreement well after the mediation took place. The record before this Court also shows a 
clear issue of fact as to whether the parties agreed the settlement would be final prior to execution 
of written documents. Seward's counsel made herself the primary witness on his behalf, and her 
affidavits demonstrate the existence of many material facts precluding summary judgment. The 
district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Seward should therefore be 
reversed. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Seward Failed to Prove the Absence of a Genuine Issue of Material Fact. 
Seward, as the moving party, bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudsen, 150 Idaho 664, 670-671, 249 P.3d 857, 862-
63 (2011 ). Only then does the burden shift to Musick Auction to show the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass 'n., 
Inc., 152 Idaho 338,344,271 P.3d 1194, 1200 (2012). Because this is essentially an appeal of a 
motion for summary judgment, this Court is bound to construe all facts and inferences in a light 
most favorable to Musick Auction as the non-moving party. 
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In attempting to enforce the alleged settlement agreement, Seward had two methods from 
which to choose: 1) amendment of the pleadings to add an alternative count for breach of the 
alleged agreement and a request for evidentiary hearing or 2) a motion to enforce settlement 
agreement. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudsen, 150 Idaho 664,249 P.3d 857 (2011). While 
Seward was not required to initiate a new lawsuit to enforce the alleged settlement agreement, it 
would have been, as the court stated in Mihalka v. Shepard, "better practice ... to amend [his] 
pleadings to add a cause of action for breach of contract rather than, as here, filing a motion for 
summary judgment." Id, 145 Idaho 547,551, 181 P.3d 473,477 (2008). The Vanderford 
opinion cautions against filing a motion for enforcement of settlement agreement and facing the 
summary judgment burden of proof required: 
Once again, we strongly urge practitioners who reach a settlement after a 
lawsuit has been initiated to amend their pleadings to add in the alternative 
a count for breach of the settlement agreement. The court can then hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the issues going to the formation of the new 
agreement and can decide credibility issues and disputed issues of fact. 
Vanderford at 674,249 P.3d at 867, Footnote 4 (citing Mihalka at 551, 181 P.3d at 477) (Internal 
citations omitted). 
Given the fact that the recorded agreement was either not taken or not available, it would 
have been the best practice for Seward to amend his pleadings to add a claim for breach of the 
settlement agreement or at a minimum to request an evidentiary hearing. Had he chosen this 
route, both parties would have been afforded the opportunity to present testimony and cross-
examine witnesses. The trier of fact would have been able to resolve all disputed issues of fact. 
Instead, Seward chose to bring a motion to enforce settlement agreement, and thus, is bound by 
the summary judgment standard of proof. 
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Despite Seward's failure to meet his burden, the strength of Worley's Affidavit, and the 
district court's legal obligation to view all facts and evidence in a light most favorable to Musick 
Auction, Seward succeeded in convincing the district court to grant summary judgment in his 
favor. This Court is now charged with holding Seward to the burden he chose. Therefore, the 
question on appeal is not whether there was substantial evidence to support the district court's 
finding that the parties entered into the alleged oral settlement agreement, but whether any 
genuine issues of material fact exist precluding its enforcement. Vanderford at 672, 249 P.3d at 
865. Applying this standard to the evidence contained in the record, no conclusion can be drawn 
other than Seward failed to meet this burden and the district court's ruling must be reversed. 
B. The Court Minutes Cannot Establish the Intent of the Parties or the Terms of the 
Settlement Agreement as a Matter of Law. 
Seward continues to reply upon the Court Minutes - discretionary notes taken by a court 
clerk without any reference to the terms actually agreed upon by the parties. The clerk who took 
the minutes stated that the "parties and their counsel concurred with the settlement agreement as 
set forth on the record by the Court." R., p. 41. Seward argues that there is "no better, or more 
accurate, objective manifestation of the intent to be bound by the terms of the settlement 
agreement than the acknowledgment of such terms by the parties in open court before the district 
judge." Respondent's Brief, p. 9. While this could be true, the Court Minutes do not state the 
terms of the agreement the parties intended to be bound by - no doubt a key element to the 
enforceability. There must be no absence of material fact as to not just whether the parties 
intended to be bound, but also what terms they intended to be bound to. Without both, there 
cannot be an enforceable agreement. The Court Minutes do not contain any such terms. 
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Seward argues that the actual recording of the hearing before Judge Dunn at the 
conclusion of mediation is not required per Idaho Rule of Evidence 1004( 1). Seward asserts that 
the Court Minutes presented to the District Court were sufficient to meet its burden of proof that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the terms of settlement. However, what 
Seward fails to acknowledge is that while I.R.E. 1004( 1) states that the original recording is not 
required, and that other evidence of the contents of a recording is admissible, subsection (4) 
clarifies that is only the case if "the recording is not closely related to a controlling issue." 
Clearly, the missing recording in this case is not only closely related, but completely decisive of 
a controlling issue, i.e., what the exact terms and conditions of the alleged settlement agreement 
were. 
Seward appears to also be arguing that the Court Minutes are a sufficient substitute for 
the missing tape recording of the verbal agreement made in open court, citing to I.R.E. 1004(1). 
Yet again, the Court Minutes do not provide the actual terms and conditions of the oral 
agreement placed on the record, and cannot be characterized as alternate evidence to establish 
the terms of the oral agreement. Whether the Court Minutes are admissible does not end the 
query. Musick Auction no doubt raised the issue to the district court that the tape recording was 
likely the necessary piece of evidence to establish mutual intent. Seward cites U.S. v. Gerhart, 
538 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1976) for the proposition that the Court Minutes were correctly accepted 
by the district court as sufficient evidence under I.R.E. 1004(1) of the contents of the lost 
recording. However, Gerhart only supports the admissibility of the court minutes and Williams' 
Affidavit, two things which are not contested. The primary issue in Gerhart was whether a 
photocopy of a check was admissible to prove the contents of the original. 
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The Gerhart Court further stated "once an enumerated condition of Rule 1004 is met, the 
proponent may prove the contents of a writing by any secondary evidence, subject to an attack 
by the opposing party not as to admissibility but to the weight given the evidence, with final 
determination left to the trier of fact." Id. at 809 (citing 5 J. Weinstein, Evidence P 1004(01), at 
1004-4, 1004-5 (1975)) (emphasis added). This comports with I.R.E. 104, which provides that 
while preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the 
court, a party has the right to "introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or 
credibility." I.R.E. 104(e) (2017) (emphasis added). This is also borne out by I.R.E. 1008, 
which delineates between the functions of the court and the jury as trier of fact regarding the 
admissibility of other evidence of the contents of a recording as follows: "when an issue is 
raised ... ( c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, the issue is for 
the trier of fact to determine as in the case of other issues of fact." I.R.E. 1008 (2017) 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, regardless of admissibility, the Court Minutes are not a substitute for the recording 
or the parties' testimony. 
C. Seward's Attorney's Affidavit Does Not Establish a Settlement Agreement as a 
Matter of Law. 
Given that the Court Minutes do not provide any terms of the agreement reached at the 
mediation, Seward must rely on Williams' Affidavit to prove the oral agreement reached was the 
final agreement between the parties. Seward acknowledges that, in order for an oral settlement 
agreement to be enforceable, there must be a manifestation of mutual intent to be bound and a 
meeting of the minds regarding the essential terms of the agreement. Respondent's Brief, p. 12. 
Seward argues that the emails between the parties' counsel attached to Williams' affidavit 
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demonstrate "Seward's counsel, at all times, insisted that a binding settlement had been reached 
and that the questionable terms included by Musick Auction's counsel were not part of the 
agreement placed before the court." Respondent's Brief, p. 15. Seward then quotes selected 
sections of emails sent by Kimberly Williams. Id. 
Seward's argument in this regard is misplaced because Ms. Williams' emails cannot 
establish the intent on the part of Musick Auction to be bound to the settlement agreement prior to 
execution of a written document. Intent is typically a question of fact. Moreover, it is undisputed 
that a written agreement was to be prepared and signed prior to the time the agreement was 
finalized. This fact can be gleaned from several sections in the record. 
For example, in an email sent December 15, 2015, by Ms. Williams to Mr. Webb, she 
requests several changes to the settlement agreement drafted by Mr. Webb and states: "with 
those changes Mr. Seward will sign the settlement agreement." R., p. 34. Again, on November 
30, 2015, Ms. Williams states: "Mr. Seward is prepared to sign the settlement agreement with 
the revisions sent to you previously. Please have the revised agreement to me by Wednesday, 
December 2°ct, at 12:00 p.m. Otherwise we will have to move forward with litigation of this 
matter." R., p. 25. 
Moreover, in her Reply Affidavit filed with the district court, Ms. Williams testified: 
"The first time any indication was made regarding settlement documents was after the 
conclusion of mediation and after the terms had been read into the records at the hearing held the 
same day as the mediation, wherein Judge Dunn asked Defendant to prepare the associated 
documents." R., p. 78. It should first be noted that the Court Minutes directly contradict Ms. 
Williams' testimony. The Court Minutes clearly state: "the Court directed Mr. Webb to submit 
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necessary documents to dismiss the case, including a release."1 R., p. 41. Thus, Ms. Williams' 
testimony that there was no mention of documents to be drafted until after the hearing is not 
accurate. Second, Ms. Williams' acknowledgment in her Reply Affidavit that "associated 
documents" were to be prepared and signed (regardless of when this was first agreed upon), 
create an issue of fact as to whether or not the parties intended to be bound by the oral agreement 
prior to execution of written documents. 
The submission of Williams' Reply Affidavit merely illustrates that the opposing party's 
fact is disputed, i.e., that the parties agreed there would be a written settlement agreement. 
Charles 0. Bradley Trust v. Zenith Capital LLC, No. C 04-02239 JSW, 2008 WL 3400340, at *6 
n.2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (Defendant's introduction of new evidence "creates a dispute of 
fact" precluding summary judgment); Pieszak v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 112 F.Supp.2d 
970, 984 n.13 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (Defendants' reply evidence "merely creates a genuine issue for 
trial."); Johnson v. Freeburn, 29 F.Supp.2d 764, 768 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (Defendant's affidavits 
created dispute of material fact which precluded summary judgment); Fasules v. D.D.B. 
Needham Worldwide, Inc., No. 89 C 1078, 1989 WL 105264, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 
1989) (Contrary evidence in defendants' reply brief undermined summary judgment); Ry. Labor 
Executives Ass'n v. Long Island R.R. Co., 651 F. Supp. 1284, 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (Movant's 
reply affidavits raised more factual issues than they resolved). 
Finally, in her email to counsel Brian Webb of November 18, 2015, Williams states "you 
were tasked with drafting the agreement pursuant to the terms discussed at mediation and on the 
1 The presiding judge, or court, was not present at the time the minutes were taken. The clerk incorrectly refers to 
Judge Dunn as the Court. Judge Dunn served as an agreed upon mediator for the case, and not a Judge. 
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record at hearing." R. p. 23. This indicates that Williams was well aware there was to be a 
written agreement and further contradicts the Reply Affidavit she later filed. Thus, the 
Affidavits of Seward's counsel cannot establish an oral settlement agreement as a matter of law, 
and instead create genuine issues of fact. 
D. The Record is Clear the Parties Contemplated the Execution of a Written 
Agreement and Release Prior to Payment of Funds and Dismissal of the Case. 
It is well settled that "[ w ]hether the parties to an oral agreement or stipulation become 
bound prior to the drafting and execution of a contemplated formal writing is largely question of 
intent." Vanderford at 772, 249 P.3d at 865 (citing Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 
P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002)). The formation of a contract requires mutual assent, or "[a] distinct 
understanding common to both parties .. .in order for a contract to exist." Thompson v. Pike, 122 
Idaho 690, 696, 838 P.2d 293, 299 (1992). Furthermore, formation of a valid contract requires 
that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. 
Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 898, 204 P.3d 532, 538 (Ct.App. 2009) (citations 
omitted). When there is a dispute over contract formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
prove a distinct and common understanding between the parties. Id. Whether there is a sufficient 
meeting of the minds to form a contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. 
Vanderford at 772,249 P.3d at 865 (citing Shields & Co. v. Green, 100 Idaho 879, 882, 606 P.2d 
983, 986 (1980)). 
In its Opening Brief, Musick Auction discusses the applicability of Vanderford, 
Lawrence, and Thompson, supra in determining whether there was a meeting of the minds in this 
case sufficient for the district court to have held that an enforceable oral contract was made 
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during mediation. Seward attempts to distinguish this case from all three opinions by arguing 
that in all those cases, unlike here, there was no reading of the terms of the alleged settlement on 
the record in open court, with acknowledgment of the terms by the parties. Respondent's Brief, 
pp. 14-17. What Seward fails to acknowledge is that no recording exists containing the actual 
terms and conditions allegedly read into the record that day. That leaves the Affidavits of 
Williams and Worley, along with the Court Minutes and emails to determine whether an 
enforceable oral agreement to settle was made as a matter of law. The law and analysis utilized 
in all three cases is sound and applicable to the case at hand. When applied to the evidence in 
this case, the only conclusion to be had is that there was no meeting of the minds sufficient to 
form an enforceable oral settlement agreement. 
Seward alleges Musick Auction has offered no evidence to dispute the accuracy of the 
Court Minutes or Williams" characterization thereof. However, Worley's Affidavit directly 
contradicts Williams' characterization of the alleged settlement agreement. In his Affidavit, 
Worley clearly states that "[ d]uring mediation, I agreed to some terms of a settlement agreement, 
such as the amount to be paid to the Plaintiff." R. p. 73; Worley's Affidavit, 13. He goes on to 
state that, "During the mediation, I agreed, that the settlement would be final when a written 
agreement containing all terms was signed." Id., 15 (Emphasis added). 
Worley's Affidavit likewise further contradicts Williams', as his testimony clearly states 
that "[o]ne of the main terms was a confidentiality agreement." R. p. 73, Worley's Affidavit, 1 
7. Worley's Affidavit clearly raises issues of fact with regard to whether the parties intended the 
settlement would be complete upon the signing of a final written agreement. However, despite 
Worley's Affidavit containing facts that clearly contradict the characterization of events 
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contained within Williams' Affidavits, the district court summarily dismissed it as failing to 
contain "any admissible factual information" to dispute the evidence.2 R. pp. 92-93. The 
district court further stated that Williams' Affidavit, in combination with the Court Minutes 
constituted "uncontroverted evidence ... that the parties established a binding settlement 
agreement" at mediation. R. pp. 92-93. This adoption of Williams' Affidavit as more persuasive 
than Worley's contradicts the district court's role on a motion for summary judgment, since 
"judging credibility is not appropriate during summary judgment proceedings where no 
evidentiary hearing has been held." Vanderford at 674,249 P.3d 857, 867 (citing Baxter v. 
Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 172, 16 P.3d 263,269 (2000)) ("It is not proper for the trial judge to 
assess the credibility of an affiant at the summary judgment stage when credibility can be tested 
in court before the trier of fact.")). 
The district court should not favor Williams' affidavit over Worley's conflicting 
Affidavit, and in fact, was bound to favor the evidence submitted by Musick Auction as the non-
moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 
1992) (Refusing to credit movant's version of the facts); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th 
Cir. 1980) (Court's obligation to credit factual assertions in favor of the party opposing summary 
judgment); Richburg v. Palisades Collection LLC, 247 F.R.D. 457,464 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 
2008) (Court "must credit the non-moving party's evidence over that presented by the moving 
party."); Owsiak v. Kimco Corp., No. 95 C 4116, 1997 WL 722990, at* 11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 
1997) (Reply evidence did "not extinguish any genuine dispute" because court could not "ignore 
[contrary] testimony"). 
2 The district court did not provide any explanation as to what parts of Worley's affidavit may not be admissible. 
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Williams' Affidavits, in addition to being contradicted by Worley, an actual party to this 
proceeding, are poor substitutes for the affidavit of Seward himself to attempt to prove that there 
was a meeting of the minds sufficient to have formed a binding oral settlement agreement. 
While Williams' Affidavits may technically be admissible, it is inappropriate for Williams to 
testify in place of her client regarding whether there was a meeting of the minds of the parties, 
and in support of what is essentially a motion for summary judgment, when Seward is clearly 
able to do so, and it would have constituted best practice. The correct inquiry is whether there is 
a meeting of the minds of the parties, not their attorney's interpretation thereof. Accordingly, 
the district court should have given much less weight to Williams' Affidavit (and Williams' 
Reply Affidavit had it considered it) than Worley's. 
Seward chose to bring this action as a motion to enforce settlement agreement rather than 
requesting an evidentiary hearing where he could testify as to the terms and conditions of the 
alleged settlement agreement. Seward's testimony as a party should have been critical to the 
district court's analysis of the facts which support a finding on summary judgment that an oral 
settlement agreement existed as a matter of law. Williams' testimony was unnecessary when 
Seward was available. 
Consistent with Worley's Affidavit, the emails further indicate the parties intended the 
written agreement to be the final expression of their oral agreement to agree, since the parties 
continued to negotiate the terms of settlement throughout. When Worley refused to sign the 
proposed settlement agreement without a confidentiality provision, Seward initially refused, then 
agreed. In a December 3, 2015 email to Webb, Williams stated: "I have spoken with Mr. 
Seward, he will include a confidentiality agreement upon the following conditions." She then 
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outlined additional terms that Seward wanted included, in addition to an extra $10,000.00. R. p. 
29. 
On December 7, 2015, Webb responded on behalf of Worley, declining the payment of 
an additional $10,000.00. R. p. 30. On December 15, 2015, Williams conveyed Seward's offer 
to settle without Worley's payment of an additional $10,000.00, but with the inclusion of the 
previously proposed terms. R. pp. 31, 34. After bantering back and forth through their attorneys 
for another week, the parties could not ultimately agree on the terms to include in the written 
agreement. These emails demonstrate that, contrary to Seward's assertion that all terms and 
conditions were agreed to orally on the day of mediation, the parties 1) intended for the written 
agreement to be a final expression of the settlement; and 2) did not and could not agree on the 
written terms and conditions of agreement. 
Throughout her emails with Webb, Williams never once asserted that there were only two 
terms of settlement, namely the dismissal of the case by Seward in exchange for the payment of 
$15,000.00 as she asserts in her Affidavit of May 19, 2016, a full five months after negotiations 
broke down. R. pp. 19-38; R. pp. 13-16. This inconsistency in the evidence also constitutes a 
genuine issue of material fact. 
E. Seward is not entitled to attorney's fees on the basis of frivolity 
Seward alleges that Musick Auction has brought this appeal frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation, and that he is therefore entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121. In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party. Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 730, 302 P.3d 349,355 (2013). An award of 
attorney fees under [LC.] § 12-121 is not a matter ofright to the prevailing party. Id. (quoting 
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Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009)) (internal quotations 
omitted). In deciding whether to award attorney fees per I.C. § 12~121, the "entire course of the 
litigation must be taken into account and ifthere is at least one legitimate issue presented, 
attorney fees may not be awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal 
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Id. 
Arguing that Musick Auction failed to place any evidence in the record to refute a valid 
oral agreement to settle, Seward declares himself the prevailing party herein. As argued above, 
the district court failed to consider all the evidence submitted in the case and it failed to apply the 
appropriate summary judgment standard when presented with evidence that created a genuine 
issue of material fact. Musick Auction was within reason to file an appeal rather than be forced 
into a settlement agreement on terms it did not agree to. It should be noted that the district court 
denied Seward's request for attorney's fees in the action below. Seward was not held to be the 
prevailing party, and so his fees were denied on this basis. Based upon the foregoing, Seward's 
request for attorney's fees should be denied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The record before this Court shows the parties did not intend for this case to be over until 
the final written agreement was signed. Musick Auction definitely did not intend to pay any money 
to Seward without a sufficient written agreement that protected all of its interests. Musick Auction 
respectfully requests this Court review all the facts and evidence in a light most favorable to 
Musick Auction, and reverse the grant of summary judgment to Seward. 
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DATED: June 6, 2017. 
By--==-=-~"""""'"----1-1------l.--~~~----
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